Abstract Traditional Medicare is being threatened from two political directions. The current Republican coalition, on the right, simply dislikes social insurance in principle. It seeks privatization for its own sake. Another perspective, centrist and well established among political and economic elites, worries that the program is "unaffordable," whatever its basic merits. Defenders of traditional Medicare need to address both threats by explaining why the budgetary fears are misconceived and why privatization is simply a bad idea. In order to do this, they need to take the budgetary high ground, argue more strenuously for short-term cost controls, and criticize the extra spending that the Bush administration has used to encourage private plans within Medicare. Defenders of social insurance should also seek good policy and political allies by proposing that Medicare's network of providers, prices, and administration be made available to employers (and other pools) in much the way that selfinsured groups currently rent networks from private insurers.
Medicare's managers are inherently efficient; the claims processing is done by private insurers. Medicare simply has fewer expenses.
As Glenn Hackbarth, the former vice president of Harvard Community Health Plan who chairs MedPAC, explained at a MedPAC meeting, the commission's "consistent benchmark" for paying private plans within Medicare "is what would have been spent for the same patients under traditional fee-for-service." But, he added, "that does not mean that the payments are adequate to cover the plans' costs. . . . In fact, having been in this world and worked for a plan trying to do this, I know what a disadvantage it is to have higher administrative costs, the marketing costs, and in the case of for-profit plans taxes and the like. So you're behind before you even start in this game" (MedPAC 2003: 5) .
Private plans might make up for their extra costs in two legitimate ways. One would be by paying lower fees per service than Medicare does. Because insurers' fee data is proprietary, one cannot be absolutely sure, but the odds are that only a small portion of plans extract lower prices. Not only is Medicare's market power unmatched, but within the Medicare world, it is hard to see why any provider would contract to accept less than the Medicare price when it knows any beneficiary can stay in traditional Medicare. 1 Private plans also could make up for their disadvantages on both overhead costs and (likely) prices paid by limiting volume, as "managed care" promises to do. Counties in which traditional Medicare is more expensive tend to be characterized by higher volume, and enrollment in private plans has historically been disproportionately high in those communities (Congressional Budget Office [CBO] 2004: 7). Yet, as recognized by Hackbarth, plan managers have difficulty implementing enough management to make up for the other difficulties. Hence, it seems likely that a significant part of past private insurance business within Medicare has been enabled by a less admirable factor: risk selection - a pattern in which the individuals who enroll in private plans are healthier than the norm, so paying those plans based on normal costs in essence subsidizes them. As the Congressional Budget Office (CBO 2004: 4) summarized, "There is considerable evidence that Medicare HMO enrollees were healthier than 1. The 2003 legislation allowed creation of private fee-for-service (PFFS) plans. Some lack of belief in the bargaining power of private insurers, at least in the areas where PFFS plans will show up, is shown by the fact that PFFS plans are allowed to pay by the Medicare fee-forservice (FFS) rates (CBO 2004: 6) . Thus, Medicare's bargaining power is made into a safety net for private insurers. Regional preferred provider organizations (PPOs) have also been allowed to use Medicare rates in order to use out-of-network providers when they have trouble building networks (MedPAC 2006: 205). fee-for-service (FFS) beneficiaries and that those differences were not fully accounted for by the demographic adjusters included in the payment formula."
Even with some risk selection, however, private insurers' share of Medicare enrollees dropped between 1999 and 2003. According to the plans' own reports to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), about half of Medicare beneficiaries in 2003 lived in communities where the plans could cover basic Medicare benefits for less than the average cost in traditional Medicare (CBO 2004: 7 ; see also MedPAC 2005b, figure 3.1). These submissions, however, are from the plans that did participate, perhaps benefited from some risk selection, and in total covered less than 12 percent of Medicare beneficiaries. So this data shows only that some HMOs in some markets are able to improve on traditional Medicare's performance. In those markets, one would expect employers to want to offer those HMOs as an option within their benefit packages. In most cases, however, evidence from within Medicare suggests that traditional Medicare would offer a network that would be more satisfactory to employees, because it would be more extensive than any private PPO alternative and more satisfactory to employers because it should, on average, have lower costs.
Alternatives and Difficulties
Those who believe in traditional Medicare see it as a potential single-payer system that could replace private insurance. The same cost and choice advantages that might make the system attractive to individual employers should, in principle, make it superior to the private insurance system as a whole. Yet, replacing private insurance with "Medicare for all" seems extremely unlikely under current political conditions. Not only would it directly and immediately threaten most of the jobs and incomes in the huge health insurance industry, but it would involve a daunting array of cost transfers among groups of employers and employees. Any system of financing for Medicare for all would redistribute costs from those whose risk pools are currently advantageous to those whose pools are not, would redistribute costs based on changes in benefit packages, and likely would (and should) impose costs on those who are not currently paying for insurance for their employees. 2 3. Buy-in proposals have most commonly been focused on individuals just below the Medicare eligibility age; see, for example, McDevitt (1998 ). 4. Thus McDevitt (1998 seeks to estimate the degree of adverse selection against an individual buy-in plan.
Thus, compulsory adoption of Medicare for all poses extremely difficult redistribution challenges. Such challenges can be avoided by making participation in Medicare voluntary, which is what a Medicare "buy-in" approach would do. In the buy-in approach, employers or individuals would buy Medicare coverage from the government, just as they currently purchase coverage from private health insurers. 3 A buy-in approach, however, would require that premiums be set in some manner. If the premiums were set as a community rate, the system would be victimized by adverse selection: groups would be especially likely to participate if their predicted costs were higher than the rate. 4 Voluntary participation, then, would make Medicare appear as if it were not controlling costs as well as the private plans that would be selling to less-risky groups. Ensuring access through a buy-in could require extra government subsidies.
In a buy-in approach, the alternative to community rating is underwriting. In theory, CMS could assess the cost of any group that sought to buy into Medicare. In practice, that assessment would raise administrative costs and create unsustainable conflict: employers or individuals complaining that a "government bureaucrat" had made it impossible for them to afford insurance. In general, the American polity is unwilling to grant federal officials the kind of discretion required for discriminatory price setting (Wilson 1989) , and it is difficult to imagine that CMS would be an exception.
If risk is left with the self-insured group, however, these potential problems disappear. An employer would not pay premiums for employees; instead, it would pay for individual expenses according to the Medicare fee schedule, plus administrative charges. Since costs to the employer would directly reflect experience, there would be no reason for selection bias in any direction. There would be no risk of excess costs to the system and no need for extra subsidies. Because there would be no premiums, there would be no need to underwrite.
Large employers are the most obvious potential customers for the Medicare network because big multistate employers care most about offering the same coverage across the country with the largest possible network - which Medicare essentially is. The most obvious flaw in the proposal is that the Medicare benefits package is not very comprehensive.
But employers could choose to provide further benefits on a supplemental basis. This could be done through private plans, as in the traditional Medigap market, or through legislation that creates an optional Medicare supplemental package. It would also be necessary to expand the payment rules to cover some services that are unlikely for the Medicare population (e.g., neonatal intensive care). Yet, this is not a particularly complicated challenge, since relative values can be extrapolated from other fee schedules and calculated from existing Medicare allowed charges.
The basic question is whether this proposal would offer employers something they might want. Given the recent track record of the private insurance market, it seems reasonable to project that some employers would conclude that they would be better off trying to take advantage of the government's market power. Potentially attractive aspects of the program would include elimination of the need to shop around for networks and the ability to tell employees and unions that, if they didn't like the network or its terms, they should complain to their congressperson.
Potential Consequences of the Proposal
From the perspective of general health insurance reform, this proposal offers an incremental new option, which might be attractive to and a bit more affordable for employers and other managers of risk pools. From the perspective of the Medicare debate, however, the proposal addresses the politics of ideas, politics of interests, and politics of the budget.
In the politics of ideas, this proposal shifts the focus of the Medicare debate from the costs of Medicare to the costs of health care in general. According to the proposal, Medicare is not the cost problem that must be solved but instead is a helpful response to a larger problem. This perspective also challenges the current one-sided rhetoric about how private plans create "competition" and "choice." By illustrating that traditional Medicare is in essence the mother of all PPOs, the proposal resists the idea that private insurance is in some way inherently more efficient. Because this plan would be entirely voluntary, detractors could not honestly claim that it would rely upon "big government" coercion. The plan would probably be attacked as being "big government" anyway, but to the extent that employers choose this method of covering their employees, the rhetoric would seem hollow.
In the politics of interests, the proposed plan could give new groups, particularly large employers, a stake in traditional Medicare. At present, the belief that providers "cost shift" may cause employers to see the sys-tem as a rival rather than an ally. If insuring their own employees through Medicare becomes an option, employers may take a different view - and any employers who accept the option certainly would. Employers would have an interest in the government, with its market power, organizing one or very few Medicare supplemental benefit schemes in which payment and administration would be channeled through the existing Medicare system. That would be the simplest way to make the benefit package match current employer-sponsored insurance. Such a package could also be made available to traditional Medicare beneficiaries. Thus, employers could become a lobby for a true Medicare Part D: governmentally organized supplemental insurance backed by the government's cost-control power and risk pooling - in other words, a plan unlike the one that private insurers and the conservative coalition required for the Part D drug benefit.
Most important for both the politics of interests and the politics of the budget, any employers who used traditional Medicare's network and payment rules would suddenly have a stake in Medicare cost control. Given the current fear of cost shifting, it is in the best interest of employers to have Medicare pay as generously as possible. Moreover, there are few interest groups that show a strong interest in controlling Medicare costs. Advocates for the elderly have some interest in limiting payments, because higher payments lead to higher premiums. Yet, seniors' premiums pay only a small portion of program costs, and one cannot expect their organizations to provide the pressure for cost-control efforts. 5 Self-insured employers would be at risk for all costs, and and so would have much more incentive to lobby for control. Employers could provide support not only for traditional measures such as fee limits but also for measures, such as chronic care case management, that have been more politically difficult to implement. Many of the approaches being studied by MedPAC (2006) at present have no obvious constituency: the approaches are unfamiliar to patients and threatening to some providers. These approaches will be more familiar and so attractive to the corporate benefits community.
5. For example, when I searched the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) policy and research Web site (www.aarp.org/research/) on August 19, 2006, for "Medicare costs," I found 217 reports and press releases dating back to 1998; none appeared to be focused on the challenge of cost control within traditional Medicare. AARP's (2005) "Medicare at Forty" report did identify the weakening of physician payment cost controls as a problem but took no strong stand. Lobbies such as AARP have played a significant role in Medicare costcontrol politics, although that role has not been to push for control per se. Instead, once cost control has been put on the agenda by others, the senior lobbies have worked to ensure that the pain was visited on providers in the form of payment controls, rather than on the elderly in the form of higher premiums or benefit cuts (White 1995 Medicare's relative success at cost control is the traditional program's most fundamental defense against privatization. This success makes privatization a less-attractive policy option for centrists concerned about the budget. It also makes private plans, within the competition created by the MMA, less likely to be able to offer better value to beneficiaries legitimately. This cost control cannot be taken for granted; it requires political will and political support, which has eroded in recent years. Thus, offering Medicare's cost controls to employers is not only in employers' interests; increasing political support for cost control would strengthen the Medicare program overall.
The Politics of Ideas

The Ideological Divide
Most readers of this journal probably dream of national health insurance. Most of the current Republican coalition, however, dislikes social insurance in principle. Hence, there was a certain amount of irony when the Bush administration and congressional Republicans expanded the entitlement to Medicare benefits with the 2003 prescription drug legislation. Yet, they clearly hoped that the long-run effect of the legislation would be to replace traditional Medicare with government-subsidized private insurance.
Their goal was clear from President Bush's original proposal, which would have provided only a very modest benefit (catastrophic coverage plus a drug discount card) to beneficiaries who stayed in traditional Medicare and much better coverage to individuals who switched into private plans (White House 2003) . Uwe Reinhardt (2003: 14) described the proposal as analogous to proud parents offering their graduating senior a choice between "(A) a Ford Taurus and (B) a similar Chevrolet, on the condition that the parents will pay for a CD player in the Ford Taurus and pick up the annual maintenance costs on it, but that they will not cover these items for the Chevrolet." The direction of the intended incentive could not have been more clear.
This design proved politically unsustainable; nevertheless, its intent motivated much of the Republican support for the final legislation. Senate Republican Conference chair Rick Santorum declared, "I believe the standard benefit, the traditional Medicare program, has to be phased out" (Pear and Toner 2003) . After the House approved the final version, Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert explained that "a lot of our folks, the hard-right guys, are not for Medicare. It's an entitlement they don't want to add on to. I had to convince them we had a chance to really reform Medicare and bend those cost curves so my kids don't end up paying 30 percent of their salaries for it" (Broder 2003) .
Speaker Hastert's description makes clear that, in his mind, the most important goal of the act was not the prescription drug benefit but the long-term transformation of Medicare as a whole. He and his colleagues believe that private insurance is simply more efficient than governmentprovided social insurance. To the current government, the superiority of the market is simple common sense. In his third debate with Senator John Kerry, President Bush explained increasing health care costs by claiming that "costs are on the rise because the consumers are not involved in the decision-making process. Most health care costs are covered by third parties. And therefore the actual user of health care is not the purchaser of health care" (Commission on Presidential Debates 2004). The solution, he explained, was health savings accounts - in short, a substantial reduction of the risk pooling that is the core of social insurance.
To some health economists, Bush's argument may seem evidently true. This is not the place to review theological disputes about the significance of moral hazard. I can only point out that the evidence seems to suggest that there is wide variation in the level of cost that accompanies the moral hazard of health insurance, that costs are much greater in the United States than in other countries even though our level of uninsurance means the "hazard" must be less in the United States, and that therefore the range of cost-control options far exceeds the limited view taken by President Bush or by free-market fundamentalists within the economics profession. 6 As a matter of politics, President Bush's argument had no obvious political advantages, so it likely reflects his actual beliefs. 7 Other conservatives are likely to be equally sincere. So there is no room for persuasion in the conflict between believers in social insurance and most of the current Republican coalition. The difference in basic premises is too great. The balance between these sides will be determined by elections and, to some extent between elections by pitched battles in the public sphere of political 6. For a much more extensive review of cost-control options, including analysis of the place of insurance reduction within those options, see White (1999) .
7. Senator John Kerry could have countered by telling the national audience that President Bush was saying costs were too high because people had insurance. Bush's solution was to cut their insurance, which was also the record of the Bush administration. Kerry could have said that a president who thought the solution to health care costs is to take away people's protection against costs is the wrong kind of president. The fact that he did not make this response may be one reason he is still a senator. debate, in which the two sides contend for support from often inattentive voters. The latter situation occurred in 2005, over proposals to privatize Social Security, and believers in social insurance won for the time being. But that battle is by no means the end of conflict over social insurance.
The most visible threat to Medicare, then, is the pure ideology of the Republican coalition, the most powerful political force in the United States today. That coalition has its own think tanks to develop arguments that fit their ideology and allied news media to communicate with and mobilize its adherents. Its true believers live in a political universe alternative to the one in which most readers of this journal live. The coalition operates within a political system in which it has become much easier for the governing party to enact policies even if they are unpopular with the voters (Hacker and Pierson 2005) .
Despite its power and (prior to the 2006 election) relative immunity from retribution for unpopular positions, the coalition has not been able to enact all of its preferred policies. So it has attempted to get support from centrist voters and media by exploiting fears about the budget. That is why the politics of the budget and the people who care about the budget threaten Medicare. Budget concerns provide cover for the ideology of the conservatives, create hesitation among liberals, and convince centrists, especially the major respectable media, that if liberals do not propose major changes, then they are "irresponsible."
Centrists and the Budget
The Republican campaign against Social Security and Medicare says that the programs will become "unaffordable" as the national population ages. This argument is powerful because it has been promoted for years by the editorial boards of the major newspapers, economists at the Brookings Institution and other centrist or liberal organizations, and the routines of government budgeting and trust-fund financing (Derthick 2001; White 2003) . The Social Security and Medicare trustees annually issue warnings about and calls for action to secure the long-term viability of the programs.
During the 1990s, the CBO and the U.S. General Accounting (now Government Accountability) Office (GAO) issued a series of reports about how expanding expenses for entitlements would destroy the national economy (e.g., CBO 1997; GAO 1995) . These reports made the highly unreasonable assumption that politicians would do absolutely nothing to control the budget and thus allow deficits to reach huge levels (see White 2003) . More recent reports from CBO (2005) and GAO (2004) avoid such extreme projections but nevertheless continue to urge attention to the longterm challenges of financing Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security. Like the trustees, CBO and GAO advocate early action to control costs or increase revenues before financing gaps become especially difficult to close.
Such arguments, particularly in their 1990s form, have been and are still being used to support claims that future Medicare and other entitlement costs constitute a "crisis" that requires drastic action now (Peterson 1996; Kotlikoff and Burns 2004) . In their extreme form, these claims suggest that anyone who denies the existence of a crisis is just a shill for the "greedy geezer" special interests. Even in the more modest terms currently employed by government analysts in organizations such as CBO and GAO, the focus on long-term budget prospects argues that quick reform of programs for the elderly is responsible and any delay is irresponsible.
The Bush administration tried to exploit that conventional wisdom in their efforts to privatize Social Security (see, for instance, House Republican Conference and Senate Republican Conference 2005). Democrats responded surprisingly, but correctly, by saying there was no crisis (Hotline 2005) . For many reasons, it is clear that Medicare costs will rise dramatically in the future, and so centrists and liberals, as well as conservatives, have reason to worry about Speaker Hastert's "cost curves."
Concern about future costs is not, however, a good reason to reform Medicare in ways that would alter its character as a social insurance program. Control of Medicare costs twenty or thirty years from now is not a goal that actual human beings could pursue with any semblance of rational calculation. Moreover, the costs of Medicare should not be discussed separately from the costs of all other American health care.
Misguided Ideas in Current Medicare Debate
Defenders of traditional Medicare, and anyone concerned with making health care more affordable for all Americans, need to counter some basic misconceptions within the conventional framing of the Medicare costcontrol issue.
The first conventional misconception about Medicare is that people living longer is a major factor in increased health care costs. Older people do tend to have higher health expenses; however, this does not mean that, if we have proportionately more very old people in the future, costs should rise dramatically. A range of studies from all over the world tells us that most of the increase in medical costs associated with being older is not due to age per se but to likelihood of dying (Gray 2005; Seshamani and Gray 2004; Stearns and Norton 2004; White 2004; Zweifel, Felder, and Meiers 1999) . Eighty-year-olds, on average, cost more than fifty-yearolds because eighty-year-olds, on average, are much more likely to die, and final illnesses are expensive. If the trend is for people to live longer, then - other things being equal - seventy-year-olds in 2025 will be cheaper than seventy-year-olds today and eighty-year-olds will be cheaper than the same group today because people in each group will have lower death rates.
Conventional wisdom confuses the cost of living with the cost of dying; yet, if aging should not have major effects on health care costs, why do we have projections of dramatic increases in Medicare costs over the next seventy-five years? One answer is that increases in costs per person for Americans of all ages will occur within Medicare as well. The second answer is that the United States does not have national health insurance. If Medicare covered everybody, the effect of aging on Medicare would be much smaller.
In all other rich democracies, when a person attains age sixty-five, the extra cost to the main national health insurance arrangements is simply the difference between their costs at age sixty-four and age sixty-five. In the United States, at age sixty-five a person will normally leave some sort of private insurance and go on Medicare. So if one pays attention only to the federal budget, it looks like there is a big cost increase from seniors turning sixty-five.
Here is the second confusion: between the federal budget and the national economy. What budgetary projections show is not the effect of aging on health care costs but how aging will cause a cost shift to Medicare as many people go off private budgets and onto public budgets. The increased cost to the nation will be much less than the increased cost to Medicare.
That brings us to the third confusion in conventional wisdom, which foresees a crisis in public insurance but is blind to a crisis in private insurance. Because the major estimating reports deal with government programs, long-term forecasts of private-sector costs get little attention. It is true that health care costs will shift to government in a big way as the population ages. The increase in Medicare costs, therefore, should be proportionately much bigger than the increase in other health care costsespecially with benefits being expanded by the creation of Part D. Yet the major influence on costs of health care is the growth in costs per person.
That growth depends on a mix of technological advance and payment policies. The Medicare actuaries' estimates assume that cost per person will climb at the same rate in both Medicare and the rest of the health care system. By these assumptions, total spending on health care would rise to 38 percent of the economy by 2075 (Technical Review Panel 2000) . Even if one accepts the premise that Medicare and private insurance costs will grow at the same rate, the proportional burden of employment-based insurance would double. 8 The current private insurance system is already weakening; if the burden doubles, the private sector insurance system may well collapse. Put another way, if Medicare is going to be "unaffordable," so will all health insurance. "Fixing" Medicare through privatization is no answer at all.
The fourth confusion is between long-term and short-term cost control. Conventional wisdom says that we have to act now to control health care costs in 2030 or 2050 or 2075. But we cannot. Health care cost control is not a long-term problem. It is only a series of short-term ones. 9 Policy can protect the government's budget. Abolishing Medicare would eliminate its costs. Turning Medicare into a voucher system could have a similar, though smaller and slower, effect: if the federal contribution were restrained to grow much more slowly than costs, risk would be transferred to beneficiaries. Tough luck for them, but the budget would be protected.
The current Republican coalition might be willing to live with those consequences. If explained clearly, however, I do not think this idea would attract most centrists. I suspect most Americans believe that the goals of Medicare policy should be to control costs, not to transfer them to the sick. The basic difficulty is that health care cost control is a continual contest between the people for whom costs are costs and the people for whom costs are incomes. The people for whom costs are incomes are smart and 8. It seems more likely that Medicare costs will grow more slowly: over the past three decades, Medicare costs have grown about 1 percentage point per year more slowly than costs of private insurance (Boccuti and Moon 2003a, 2003b) . Assuming the same overall rate of cost increase per capita as the technical panel did (1 percent faster than per capita income), that would leave private insurance somewhat above 1 percent and Medicare somewhat below; the faster growth in costs for private insurance would leave it even less affordable than in the argument I present in the text.
9. An anonymous reviewer of this article commented that "cost control is indeed a long-term problem. What the author means is that it can't be solved with long-term solutions or solutions based on estimates of costs decades out." I agree that cost control will be a problem far into the future, but that could be said of almost anything - education, national security, or the weather, for instance. The concept of problem here is based on the work of Aaron Wildavsky (1979: 42, 82 - 83, 388 - 389) , who argued that it is only sensible to define "problems" if it is possible to conceive solutions to the problems as defined. Hence, as he expressed it to classes I attended, "no solution, no problem." aggressive and politically powerful and promise great benefits that we all want more than anything else: longer, more active, and less painful lives. While other countries perform cost control more effectively than the United States does, in all countries cost control is a process of move and countermove. The providers cannot be defeated permanently because most of us need them, and they will always have expertise and other political resources.
There is no way to control costs permanently. What policy makers can do is stay one step ahead of the providers, most of the time. 10 Any savings in the short run can translate into savings in the long run because spending compounds from a lower base. In the late 1990s, Congress and the president stumbled into big Medicare savings. 11 Those savings reduced spending in 2000 from what it had been projected to be according to 1995 calculations. These reductions cut the base from which costs would grow afterward, which caused estimated costs in 2020 or 2070 also to fall dramatically. Conversely, "givebacks" and benefit expansions since 2000 have increased long-term estimates by inflating the current cost baseline.
The most important, indeed the only practical thing, policy makers can do about costs in 2030 or 2050 is to control costs for the next five years. Five years from now they should do something else - but we cannot forecast the right methods now because we do not know what the tactics of the people for whom costs are incomes will be. We do not even know how attractive providers' products will seem and, consequently, how many services at how high a price the nation might want to buy.
I emphasize these points because they determine what "responsible" Medicare policy could be, and so what centrists should support. If they accept the idea that we have to "guarantee" much lower costs to the government far in the future, then "responsibility" can only mean cutting Medicare's guarantee of benefits. If centrists agree, however, that their goal should be to limit the costs of actual health care now and in the future, then "responsibility" means controlling costs now.
Supporters of social insurance must challenge the conventional wisdom that Medicare must be "saved" now because of the effects of an aging 10. Or, maybe, policy makers play catch-up as competently as possible, so as to lose the game more slowly.
11. I say "stumbled" because the savings provisions of the 1997 Balanced Budget Act were quite modest. However, the effects of a legislative and administrative campaign against Medicare "fraud and abuse" appear to have been quite major, as noted in CBO (1999: 72) and Board of Trustees (2000: 10 -11) . Such potential savings were not a noticeable topic within deliberations about Medicare cost control at the time, and the actual level of cost control far exceeded any projections. society. They can argue that this analysis confuses the cost of aging with the cost of dying and confuses government costs with social burdens. They should make the case for short-term cost control as the most practical road to long-term fiscal responsibility. Most important, Medicare supporters need to advocate for public effort as the most socially efficient and secure way to finance health care. So long as only government "spending" is viewed as an inherent problem, supporters of social insurance can only play defense case by case (Pierson 2001) .
Competition under the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act I have argued that one way to show the efficiency of traditional Medicare is to give employers the option to use its network and payment rules. However, that is only a proposal, while the current competition within the Medicare program is a reality. Hence, within the battle of ideas, supporters of social insurance need to make clear why the current competition is not fair.
How the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act Tilts the Playing Field
Standard accounts of the 2003 legislation explain that it favors private plans in both direct and indirect ways. "The MMA significantly increased payment levels" for private insurers (Technical Review Panel 2004: 47) . Creation and encouragement of a PPO option was expected to attract potential enrollees who distrusted HMOs; in addition, the PPO option was favored by creation of a $10 billion fund to reward plans that "participate on a regional or national basis" (CBO 2004: 8) and by a provision for CMS to share some of the plans' risks for medical expenses during the first two years of the program. In addition, Medicare incorporates into the rates it pays private plans the per capita cost of indirect medical education (IME) payments to hospitals, even though Medicare Advantage (MA) plans do not pass that money on to hospitals. So in essence, the IME subsidy for MA plan members is paid twice - once directly to the hospitals and once to the plans.
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services has also used administrative decisions to bias the competition in favor of private plans. It tried to promote PPOs through a demonstration with reduced monitoring of quality and higher payments, although this demonstration mainly illustrated public indifference to the idea (CBO 2004: 10) . Making network requirements for regional PPOs looser than for other PPOs, CMS allowed the former to use Medicare FFS rates to pay nonnetwork providers (Med-PAC 2006: 205) . CMS also determined that improvements in risk adjustment should not be applied if their net effect would be to reduce payments to MA plans. As MedPAC noted, "Any policy that increases risk-adjusted payments prevents risk adjustment from addressing risk-profile differences between beneficiaries in the MA and FFS programs. The ultimate effect is that payments for MA enrollees will be systematically higher than payments for those same beneficiaries if they enrolled in FFS Medicare" (MedPAC 2005b: 80) .
The net result of these and other measures is that, on average, Medicare in 2005 was paying plans 107 percent of what it would have cost to treat the same patients under traditional Medicare (MedPAC 2005b: 77) . Although MedPAC frequently recommended changes to make the competition between MA plans and traditional Medicare financially neutral, these recommendations have been studiously ignored.
The competition has also been tilted to favor private insurers in some more subtle ways. First, there has been little effort to control costs within traditional Medicare since 2001. Traditional Medicare did an excellent job of controlling costs - much better than the private sector - in the late 1990s. Although interest-group pressures to increase spending surely mattered, the Bush administration's long-term strategy gave it little reason to resist. The administration clearly did not care enough about the budget to restrain spending, and because payments to private plans are based on the costs of traditional Medicare, constraining those costs can only make it more difficult for private plans to profit by participating.
Second, alternative methods of prescription-drug coverage under the MMA clearly favor MA plans. Enrollees who would like to keep their traditional FFS Medicare and elect separate Part D drug insurance are forbidden to buy any supplemental drug insurance. Thus, they are limited to the extent of coverage available in separate Part D plans. Meanwhile, any Part D plan must cover the costs of its marketing within the fairly small envelope of drug costs. An MA plan, however, collects not only Part D payments but the payments for Parts A and B as well. Therefore, marketing costs should be proportionately smaller for the MA plans, allowing them to provide a better drug benefit, especially if they are overpaid for Parts A and B in the first place.
Experience with the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act
The result of all the advantages for private plans, at a minimum, is that a great many plans have chosen to participate in the new MA system. 12 MedPAC also reports that "about 95 percent of plans bid under their benchmarks, thus almost all plans had funds to rebate in the form of lower Medicare cost sharing, lower Part B or Part D premiums, or non-Medicare supplemental benefits" (MedPAC 2006: 200) . Nobody can know how this competition will evolve. Perhaps companies that have recently entered the Medicare market will be exiting shortly, as has occurred with Medicare and Medicaid in the past. Alternately, it is possible that over the next few years, since individuals are being pushed to look at alternatives in order to take up their Part D coverage and the MA plans are starting with so many advantages, a substantial number of enrollees will leave traditional Medicare and choose private plans instead.
Medicare Advantage plans do appear to be able to offer superior drug benefits, although direct comparison of any two plans is hard because of the difficulty of evaluating formularies. Having said that, I can report that when I consulted the Medicare Personal Plan Finder and the separate system to find a Part D plan for my local zip code (44118), I found some MA plans that charged no Part D premium, while all the stand-alone Part D plans charged a premium. 13 It should be no surprise, then, that implementation of the new drug benefit has been associated with a significant increase in Medicare enrollees choosing to switch from traditional Medicare to one of the private insurance options. Between July 2005 and July 2006, total MA enrollment rose by more than 25 percent - from 13.4 percent to 16.3 percent of Medicare beneficiaries. 14 12. The number of plans is deceptive, because a given insurer may sponsor multiple plans. MedPAC (2006) reports the pattern for the regional PPOs, one of the major innovations from the MMA. The country was divided into twenty-six regions, and no plans bid in five of those regions. A total of seventy-one plans bid in the other twenty-one, but Humana sponsors fortytwo of the plans, and "most regions have only one organization that sponsors several regional plans" (ibid.: 207). In my own community, the thirty-two MA plans in 2006 were sponsored by six insurers: Anthem, Humana, Kaiser, Qual Choice, Summa Care, and United Healthcare of Ohio. 14. The raw numbers were 5,793,667 in 2005 and 7,274,299 in 2006; see Kaiser Family Foundation (2006) . Interestingly, very little of this growth occurred within PPOs. Fewer than 90,000 beneficiaries joined the new regional PPOs that the MMA was designed to promote, and only 309,000 beneficiaries were members of local PPOs. Instead, beneficiaries joining private fee-for-service (PFFS) plans constituted 43 percent of the increase; most of the remaining growth occurred in local HMOs. 15 These early results suggest that, even with the advantages created in the MMA, PPOs still have difficulty competing with traditional Medicare. This, in turn, supports the idea that traditional Medicare would be an attractive network option for employers.
The results also suggest that allowing PFFS plans to use Medicare's ability to negotiate prices has significantly improved their prospects. These plans had been expected to raise Medicare's total costs because they were "likely to attract enrollees disproportionately from areas where the benchmarks [for payment to plans] are especially high relative to Medicare FFS spending" (MedPAC 2006: 206) . Until extra incentive was offered by the MMA, however, very few individuals had joined PFFS plans, apparently because PFFS plans had trouble negotiating provider prices that were low enough to enable them to provide Medicare services at costs that would enable the plans to finance extra benefits (Dallek, Biles, and Nicholas 2003) . Letting private plans use Medicare's bargaining power solved their problem and, ironically, will be used by the Republican coalition to give a false impression that "private insurance" is efficient.
Hence, from the standpoint of those who wish to turn Medicare into a system of competing private insurers, the MMA is at least a modest success so far. A 25 percent enrollment increase in the course of a year must seem quite encouraging.
Cost Increases within Traditional Medicare
While policy commentary has focused largely on implementation of the MMA, there has been another, less-publicized development. A burgeoning volume of services has put substantial pressures on Medicare spending. After falling to 2.28 percent of GDP by 2000, it rose to 2.73 percent of the national economy in 2005, even without the effects of benefit expansions in the MMA (Boards of Trustees 2006: 33) .Growth was particularly fast in "discretionary services" such as imaging and diagnostic tests; between 1999 and 2004 the number of tests increased by 43 percent and the volume of imaging services by 62 percent. This was bad not only for the federal budget but for the budgets of beneficiaries, whose Part B premiums rose much faster than the Social Security cost-of-living adjustment (Miller 2006) . 16 Medicare's fairly dismal recent cost-control experience still compares favorably to recent experience with private insurance. 17 Moreover, when the Bush administration finally suggested some very limited costcontrol measures - a total of $37 billion over five years - liberals did not exactly leap to endorse them (Cohn 2006a) . Legislators objected even to what seemed pretty modest and sensible measures. Senator Jay Rockefeller (D-WV) joined with Senator Gordon Smith (R-OR) to sponsor legislation seeking to reverse an earlier decision to cap fees for imaging services at the amounts paid to hospital outpatient departments - a measure that would reduce fees to some ambulatory imaging centers (American Health Line 2006). As total physician payments through Medicare increased significantly, the only political uncertainty was how seriously Medicare's physician payment controls would be weakened (Cohn 2006b ).
In short, the political will to control costs in traditional Medicare has become extremely weak. Defenders of the program may be distracted by their distaste for the MMA's special subsidies for private plans and may see repealing those subsidies as a higher priority than cutting payments to physicians or hospitals. Yet they should not be complacent about traditional Medicare's advantages in cost control. During the mid-1990s, private insurers controlled costs much better than Medicare did, both because of the political stalemate that prevented cost-control legislation and because of a period of more intense effort by private plans (White 2003) . Letting the lid off traditional Medicare could lead to the same result and seem to prove the arguments of those who support privatization. 16 . A portion of the increase in premiums early in the period was due to the transfer of costs for home health services from Part A to Part B, but premiums grew especially quickly in 2005 (17.4 percent) and 2006 (13.2 percent). See Miller (2006 
Leveling the Playing Field
As of the summer of 2006, Medicare remained endangered in terms of the politics of ideas, politics of the budget, and politics of interests. The conventional wisdom that politicians should adopt measures to control costs for the long term was still strong. Medicare costs were increasing quickly enough to make even fair-minded centrists worry, and those increases were due not only to the costs of the new drug benefit and some extra subsidies for private plans but also to rising costs within the traditional Medicare program. Meanwhile, the dynamic set up by the MMA threatened to alter the interest-group balance in ways that favored privatization.
The MMA's subsidies to private plans will give them a larger role and stake in Medicare. As Medicare beneficiaries join private plans in larger numbers, they will strengthen the lobby for those plans' privileges. In essence, the political strategy of the right wing in the MMA is a version of the strategy it has pursued with Social Security. In that case, claims that Social Security is unaffordable have been accompanied by a campaign to build alternative personal savings schemes, as through IRAs. 18 This gives people a stake in the alternative and is meant to reduce their perceived stake in the traditional program. In the case of Medicare, the alternative is being built within Medicare itself.
The MMA even provides for formal declaration of the "crisis" that would trigger "reform." It requires a determination each year as to whether "general revenue funding" (total Medicare outlays minus dedicated funding sources such as the payroll tax and Part B and Part D premiums) will exceed 45 percent of total Medicare outlays within seven fiscal years. The creation of Part D and further spending increases (including those that favor MA plans) in the 2003 legislation made such a determination inevitable, and the Medicare trustees issued the first determination in their 2006 report. If they make the same determination in their 2007 report, this "finding would require the President to submit to Congress, within 15 days after the date of the next budget submission, proposed legislation to respond to the warning" (Boards of Trustees 2006: 37).
There is no doubt the same determination will be made in 2007, so that in 2008 the president will submit legislation to address the Medicare "crisis" that his administration has done its part to create. Supporters of 18. I thank Steve Teles, who made this point at a roundtable on Social Security politics at the 2005 annual conference of the American Political Science Association. the traditional program must be prepared to respond to the 2008 report by putting the blame where it belongs. 19 That means that in the politics of ideas, first of all, supporters of the program should talk about how the playing field has been tilted to favor private plans, document all questionable decisions by CMS, do everything possible to study plan membership so as to determine the extent of risk selection, and emphasize how the MMA was crafted to produce the supposed crisis.
Second, in the politics of the budget supporters should explain why the focus on Medicare cost alone is misguided. Yet they should also make the case for all reasonable cost controls in traditional Medicare. For example, it seems entirely logical to reduce fees for imaging relative to fees for other services. If one service is growing far more quickly than others, then the incomes for those physicians are growing much more quickly than for other doctors. So discriminatory fee constraint can be presented as a matter of equity among physicians. 20 Providers, of course, will claim that lower fees will make it impossible to provide the services, but providers always say that, and those claims should always be taken with a box or two of salt. If Medicare spending for imaging has increased by 60 percent over five years, then it seems likely that providers can survive some restraint.
Arguing for budget restraint, however, can only gain enemies in the politics of interests. That is one more reason to allow employers to use Medicare's network and cost controls for their self-insured plans.
Within the politics of ideas, this initiative offers clear rhetorical advantages. If private insurers can compete with Medicare for seniors, why shouldn't Medicare be allowed to compete with private insurers for workers? Supporters of allowing others to use the Medicare network could use the proposal to publicize the facts about the extent of the network and its history of relative cost control. They might argue that the proposal could help private employers compete in the international marketplace, because foreign companies pay less for health benefits.
Opponents might say the government would be unfairly competing with private insurers, but that would seem to admit that private insurance is 19. Conservatives have attempted to back up this declaration of crisis with reforms of the congressional budget process that would require spending cuts and greatly inhibit use of general revenues to cover increased costs. See Greenstein et al. (2006) . 20. Maintenance of relative incomes among physicians is the major political justification for Japanese practice, in which fees are lowered in response to volume increases, in the manner suggested here. In fact, manipulation of fees for imaging is the most visible case of such policies (Campbell and Ikegami 1998). more costly. They could say that it would be bad to have the government budget grow through Medicare, but that would be less compelling if some corporations were supporting the idea. Moreover, if employers were simply renting the Medicare network, most of the expenses need not be on the federal budget at all. Opponents of the proposal could say the Medicare option for employees violates "free choice," but that is implausible on its face.
Offering the mother of all PPOs to employers as an alternative to their current networks, therefore, looks like good politics for defenders of the traditional program. It provides an opportunity to make the case for the advantages of public-sector insurance, and it could put the privatizers in an uncomfortable defensive position.
This proposal could only help in the politics of the budget and the politics of interests. It could provide a way to strengthen the constituency for short-term Medicare cost control, which is the only kind of cost control that can be responsibly implemented. This constituency for traditional Medicare's cost controls would also be a constituency for traditional Medicare.
In short, this article suggests that defenders of traditional Medicare meet the threat directly. The conservative strategy seeks to build a constituency for Medicare privatization by giving seniors more of a stake in private plans. They hope to erode Medicare by increments. This article offers a liberal strategy that would expand the constituency for Medicare beyond seniors by giving employers a stake in the program. It should strengthen, and perhaps could even expand, Medicare in an equally incremental manner.
